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I. INTRODUCTION
The sexual misuse of children' is a vexing problem for all con-
1. For several reasons, this Comment uses the term "sexual misuse" rather than "sexual
abuse." First, in some jurisdictions the term child sexual abuse is defined by statute. The
statutory definition may not correspond to the common conception that sexual abuse includes
child rape, molestation, and other forms of sexual assault regardless of the relationship of the
offender to the victim. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (1986). An expert witness may be
called in any situation in which a child was the object of an adult's sexual attention. The
narrow delineation of the term "sexual abuse," therefore, may not correspond to the scope of
situations in which experts are called regarding sexual activity involving an adult and a child.
Second, "sexual misuse," unlike "sexual abuse," does not imply that the child must be harmed
by the adult's sexual attention. Children do not always suffer psychological or physical injury
as a result of sexual misconduct by an adult. Yorukoglu & Kemph, Children Not Severely
Damaged by Incest with a Parent, 5 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 111 (1966), reprinted in
THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 125 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). The term "sexual misuse"
does not deny an appropriate role for a parent in the child's psychosexual development.
Finally, the term "sexual misuse" impliedly places the responsibility for any actual adult-child
sexual contact onto the adult regardless of the degree of the child's participation in the
initiation of the contact. A child is not capable of consenting to sexual activity with an adult.
Finkelhor, What's Wrong with Sex Between Adults and Children?, 49 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 692 (1979). The term does not imply condemnation of age-appropriate
sexual activity between peers. See generally Brant & Tisza, The Sexually Misused Child, 47
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 80 (1977) (Mental health professionals prefer the term "sexual
misuse" over "sexual abuse.").
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cerned. The subject brings forth strong and unpleasant emotions.3
These emotions may have contributed to the cursory treatment meted
out to the issue of admissibility of expert witness testimony in child
sexual misuse cases. The legal issues in determining whether the testi-
mony of an expert witness should be admitted into a court proceeding
require detached and neutral analysis. When dealing with a case that
involves an adult using a child for sexual purposes, however, such
analysis becomes difficult. The goal of this Comment is to facilitate
the objective application of standard evidentiary principles to the
issue of the admissibility of expert witness testimony in child sexual
misuse cases. This goal will be reached, in part, by focusing upon the
role of the expert psychologist in criminal prosecutions for child sex-
ual misuse. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the nature and
limits of the expertise that the psychologist can bring to the process.
The testimony of psychological experts 5 in child sexual misuse
2. For a general discussion of the difficulties in the professional management of an event
that includes allegations of the sexual misuse of a child, see Sgroi, A National Needs Assessment
for Protecting Child Victims of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS (A. Burgess, A. Groth, L. Holmstrom & S. Sgroi eds. 1978); see also
AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, CHILDREN'S DIVISION, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN
(V. DeFrancis ed. 1981) (implications of the sexual misuse of children for the practice of social
casework); D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD
(1985) (a survey of issues that relate to judging and prosecuting cases of child sexual misuse);
Boekelheide, Incest and the Family Physician, 6 J. FAMILY PRACTICE 87 (1978) (the family
physician's role in helping the incest victim); Brassard, Tyler & Kehle, Sexually Abused
Children, 12 SCH. PSYCHOLOGY REV. 93 (1983) (the complexity associated with the discovery
of the sexual misuse of a child in an educational setting, and the appropriate responses of
school officials); Denham, Toward an Understanding of Child Rape, 36 J. PASTORAL CARE
235 (1982) (the role of the chaplain and religious professionals in the management of child
sexual assault among their parishioners); Eaton & Vastbinder, The Sexually-Molested Child, 8
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 438 (1969) (aspects of the medical profession's role in cases involving
the sexual misuse of children).
3. The emotions raised by the subject of child'sexual misuse are best described by the
personal accounts of the adult survivors of childhood sexual misuse. See, -e.g., L.
ARMSTRONG, KISS DADDY GOODNIGHT (1978); S. FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF
INNOCENCE (1978).
4. Clinicians have recognized the need for objectivity in dealing with cases involving the
sexual misuse of children, but the legal literature has not emphasized this need. Gentry,
Incestuous Abuse of Children, 57 CHILD WELFARE 355 (1978). A degree of passion may make
one interested in the issue at hand, but too much passion can make one blind. See generally D.
KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT (1973) (summarizing the field of activation and
arousal with respect to cognitive functioning and discussing the impact of anxiety on
performance).
5. This comment uses the term "psychology" and its derivatives to encompass the
scientific study and clinical treatment of the behavior, thoughts, and feelings of individuals.
Besides the obvious area of psychology, the term includes the disciplines of psychiatry, social
work, and counseling. These fields are bordered on one side by a study of the physical
subcomponents of an individual (i.e., anatomy, neurochemistry), and on the other by the study
of groups of individuals larger than the family unit (i.e., sociology, anthropology).
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cases differs from the testimony of traditional scientific and technical
experts on the one hand, and the testimony of medical experts on the
other.6 Psychologists, when called as experts, do not talk about
things or objects; they talk about people.7 They do not dehumanize
people with whom they deal by treating them as objects composed of
interacting biological systems.' Rather, they speak of the whole per-
son.9 Psychologists do not focus upon broad groups of people, as do
sociologists; rather, they discuss the behavior, thoughts, and motiva-
tions of single individuals.
A psychological expert is likely to be both a clinician and a scien-
tist. Both of these sources of expertise are applied to a subject with
which nonexperts have a vague familiarity: the motivations,
thoughts, feelings, and behavior of people. ° The nonexpert's famili-
arity decreases as the expert testifies to the reaction of individuals to
increasingly less common events. Section II of this Comment will
therefore explore both the bases of the psychological expert's expertise
and the application of this expertise to child sexual misuse cases.
Three separate issues pertaining to the admissibility of expert tes-
timony are intertwined within the concept of the trier of fact's inde-
pendence: First, whether the proffered expert testimony is within the
common understanding of the trier of fact; I second, whether the tes-
timony of the expert is likely to be overvalued by the trier of fact; 12
and third, whether the testimony is likely to usurp the trier of fact's
roles of evaluating the credibility of witnesses and deciding ultimate
issues. 13 Because the lay jury has only the common experience of eve-
ryday life to apply to the fact pattern before it, there is a risk that it
6. J. ZISKIN, 1 COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 330-47
(3d ed. 1981) (discussing the similarities and differences between psychiatry and both science
and medicine).
7. See generally M. MARX & W. HILLIX, SYSTEMS AND THEORIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 167-
202 (1979) (The "gestalt" and "humanistic" branches of psychology have obtained universal
acceptance, and are today incorporated within all schools of psychological thought.).
8. Psychologists have criticized the "medical model" of client treatment. See, e.g.,
L'Abate, Skill Training Programs for Couples and Families, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY
THERAPY 631, 633 (A. Gurman & D. Kniskern eds. 1981).
9. Id. at 633-34.
10. "Psychology is a nasty little science that elaborates the obvious." Lecture by J. Plas,
Professor of Psychology, Vanderbilt University (July, 1979) (attributed to William James, one
of the pioneers of psychology). This corresponds to the common feeling that psychology does
not really teach us anything new, but simply verifies with scientific methods that which we
already know.
11. See infra note 179-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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will defer to the judgment of an expert.' 4 The variables that factor
into the court's application of discretion to all of these issues are dis-
cussed in Section II of this Comment.
Section III of this Comment explores a proposed new application
of expert witness testimony: the preservation of the child's perishable
testimony by the expert witness. Because a child's memory is known
to degenerate more rapidly than the memory of an adult,'5 courts and
commentators have questioned the competence of a child as a wit-
ness. 6 This Comment suggests, therefore, that experts assume a new
role involving the elicitation and preservation of the testimony of chil-
dren to compensate for this limitation on their ability to testify
competently.17
The testimony of psychological experts is generally solicited by
prosecutors in criminal cases that involve the sexual misuse of chil-
dren. Prosecutors tend to rely upon the evaluation of psychologists in
order to assist them in determining whether they should proceed with
the prosecution. The prosecution of cases involving the sexual misuse
of children is stressful for the prosecutor. The prosecutor must strug-
gle with a victim who may not make a credible witness, and must
grapple with the emotionally unpleasant issues of a child who has
been sexually used by an adult. The tendency has been to place as
much of this burden as possible upon the psychologist. The psycho-
logical expert usually knows how to handle the stress of operating
within the field of child sexual misuse, and is willing to accept a major
role in the litigation process. The consequence is that the role of the
expert witness in child sexual misuse prosecutions has been deter-
mined by the experts themselves-by their willingness to partici-
pate-rather than by the legal system.
II. EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
Legal literature discusses the sexual misuse of children as being
similar in nearly all cases insofar as both the facts surrounding the
14. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Middleton, 294
Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1221 (1983).
15. Memory is a complex process involving incoding, storage, and recall. In some ways a
child's memory is superior to that of an adult. With respect to the kind of information
generally deemed relevant in legal procedings, however, the child's memory is inferior. See
generally A. GLASS, K. HOLYOAK & J. SANTA, COGNITION (1979) (discussing the structure of
thought and the processes involved in memory).
16. E.g., Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985).
17. This role for the expert is similar to that proposed by Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions
for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1984).
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abusive event and the effect upon the child victim are concerned.18
Therefore, commentators present factors that impact upon the admis-
sibility of expert testimony as applicable to all cases.'9 In sharp con-
trast, the sexual misuse of children by adults includes such divergent
acts as rape,2° the incestuous abuse of a female child,2' the sexual
exploitation of a young male,22 and the calculated seduction of a
prepubescent female.3 The impact of the sexual misuse upon the
child will vary depending upon several factors, including dynamics
internal to the child, characteristics of the offender and the offense,
and the child's perception of the social environment's response to the
disclosure of the abuse. 24 The expert may be a clinician, a scientist, an
advocate, or a person engaged to facilitate criminal prosecutions.25
The prosecutor or defendant may present expert testimony for various
purposes at differing stages of the litigation.26 The above distinctions,
18. See, e.g., McCord, Syndromes, Profiles, and other Mental Exotica, 66 OR. L. REV. 19
(1987).
19. See, e.g., Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97
(1985).
20. The aggressive sexual misuse of a child is generally associated with psychopathic or
psychotic individuals. See B. JUSTICE & R. JUSTICE, THE ABUSING FAMILY 84-108 (1976).
21. The most common form of incest is termed symbiotic. It refers to the seductive
pattern that incestuous fathers typically employ in the long-term sexual misuse of female
children. This pattern involves gradually escalating, sexually inappropriate behavior by the
father over a period of numerous years. During the same time, the father will also lavish the
child with attention and gifts that are more appropriate for a spouse or lover. Id. at 31-34.
Psychologists have called this pattern the "Father-Daughter affair." See K. MEISELMAN,
INCEST 140 (1978).
22. R. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTiMS 73-106 (1979); Dixon, Arnold & Calestro, Father-Son
Incest, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 835 (1978); see also In re Marriage of P.K.A., 725 S.W.2d 78
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (abuse of a son by his father).
23. Members of the Rene Guyon Society advocate the early sexual awakening of children,
particularly females. This society is based upon the writings of Guyon. See R. GUYON, SEX
LIFE AND SEX ETHICS (1933).
24. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Ala. Ct. App. 1987) (The expert
was qualified on the basis of his five-year research program on exploited children and related
publication.); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (A social worker with
demonstated knowledge about sexual misuse qualified as an expert.); State v. LeBron, 37 Or.
App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978) (Expert testimony by an advocate for rape victims was held
admissible.); Garcia v. State, 712 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (A state agency social
worker obligated to work with law enforcement testifies as an expert.).
26. Compare State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Minn. 1987) (in the prosecution's
case in chief to establish a fact of consequence) with People v. Beckley, 161 Mich. App. 120,
123-25, 409 N.W.2d 759, 761-63 (1987) (Testimony of a rape counselor is admissible to
rehabilitate a victim who was impeached by the defendant's allegation that the victim's post-
incident behavior was inconsistent with that of a child subjected to sexual misuse.) and
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1044-48 (Wyo. 1987) (A police officer, admitted as an expert
in the field of sexual abuse, may rebut defendant's allegation that a delay in disclosing an
incident of alleged sexual misuse is inconsistent with a sexual assault.).
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among many, have an impact upon both the nature and admissibility
of the testimony.
A. The Peculiar Nature of the Sexual Misuse of Children
Unique and peculiar issues arise in a civil or criminal case stem-
ming from an allegation of the sexual misuse of a child by an adult.
The child victim may not make a credible witness.27 Children confuse
fantasy and truth.2" Courts and commentators have thus questioned
the competence of a child witness to present testimony.29 Further, a
child may be pressured to modify or retract complaints that implicate
family members. A retraction or significant modification of the origi-
nal allegation may be admissible to impeach.30 Similarly, a child's
testimony may be impeached by showing a significant delay between
the alleged occurrence of the criminal act and the child's first report
of such an occurrence.3'
Often the outcome of a case will turn upon the testimony of the
"alleged ' 32 victim versus that of the alleged offender.33 The offender
is an adult, and may be a professional, an active member of a promi-
nent social or religious organization, or an otherwise respected mem-
ber of the community. 34 The victim may be shy and withdrawn, or
27. See generally Feeney, Expert Psychological Testimony on Credibility Issues, 115 MIL.
L. REV. 121 (1987) (discussing the credibility of child witnesses, and the role of expert
witnesses with regard to credibility issues).
28. Peters, Children Who Are Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of the
Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398 (1976).
29. See Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse, 40
U. MIAMI L. REV. 245 (1985); see also People v. Draper, 150 Mich. App. 481, 487-88, 389
N.W.2d 89, 92-93 (1986) (Testimony of a three-year-old victim was admitted as competent.);
State v. Jenkins, 83 N.C. App. 616, 351 S.E.2d 299 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 675, 356
S.E.2d 791 (1987) (A four-year-old child may be competent to testify under certain
circumstances.).
30. See FED. R. EVID. 613.
31. Both a lengthy delay by the child victim in disclosing an incident of sexual misuse and
a retraction of an allegation are frequently encountered in cases involving intrafamilial sexual
abuse. See MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sex Abuse
Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 136-42 (1985).
32. The issue in many cases is whether the child fabricated or experienced the sexual
misuse.
33. If the court does not allow the psychological expert to testify and if there is no medical
evidence to be presented, which is more often the case than not, then the child's
uncorroborated testimony would likely constitute the prosecution's only evidence. See, e.g., In
re Nicole V., 123 A.D.2d 97, 106, 510 N.Y.S.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 71 N.Y.2d
112, 518 N.E.2d 914 (1987) (In many cases there is either nonexistent or inconclusive medical
evidence.).
34. Psychological research established that sex offenders do not fit any demographic
profile other than being predominantly male. Giarretto, A Comprehensive Child Sexual Abuse
Treatment Program, 6 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 263 (1982). The prison population of child
sex offenders, however, is composed of a disproportionate number of mentally disordered,
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brassy and aggressive. 35 Moreover, the victim is likely, to present tes-
timony that is inconsistent with earlier statements made to investiga-
tors,36 and may in some cases retract the accusation.37  A lay jury,
presented with conflicting testimony, is likely to attribute the child's
complaints to fantasy.38 One possible explanation for this attribution
is the use of the classical psychological defense mechanism of denial.39
The prosecutor or the investigator may deny the validity of the child's
allegation by attributing the accusation to fantasy. Under such cir-
cumstances no criminal charges will be brought.'
Involvement with the criminal justice system is frequently psy-
chologically traumatic for the child.41 This may be a factor contribut-
ing to the tendency for the families of such children not to bring
criminal charges in cases involving the sexual misuse of children. In
an attempt to mitigate this concern, standard courtroom procedures
have been modified in most jurisdictions to make the courtroom more
poor, and minority inmates. Giarretto, Humanistic Treatment of Father-Daughter Incest, 18 J.
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 59, 64-66 (1976). This disproportionate representation may be
caused by the willingness of juries to believe the child victim when the defendant fits a
stereotype of an offender.
35. Children react to traumatic events differently depending upon several factors,
including age, the type of trauma experienced, the environment, and genetic or experiential
predispositions. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987) (Particularly relevant are
diagnoses of traumatic origin, including post-traumatic stress disorder and the adjustment
disorders.) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. Many of the behavioral characteristics that have been
associated with a sexually misused child have features in common with psychiatric diagnoses.
B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, TREATING SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
3-11 (1983).
36. Children tell increasingly more complete reports of the misuse they suffered as they
grow more comfortable with the interviewers and adapt psychologically to the misuse. See,
e.g., Oklahoma v. Roubideaux, No. CRF-79492 (Okla. Cir. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 707 P.2d 35
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1985); see also Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 181 (1985) (discussion of the trial transcript of Roubideaux, and analysis of
the memory functions of a child witness as they relate to the court process). The court must
consider, however, the countervailing factors of a child's comparatively short memory and
tendency to fabricate. Id. at 203-04.
37. Children frequently retract the accusation of sexual abuse, especially in cases in which
the child has accused a member of the child's immediate household. People v. Grady, 133
Misc.2d 211, 215-16, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
38. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 178 Ga. Ct. App. 110, 115, 342 S.E.2d 338, 342 (Benham, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he lay perception is that children have vivid imaginations and conjure up
weird tales."), rev'd, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
39. See generally F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET (1980) (Feminist theory explains the
discrepancy between the incidence of child sexual misuse and the criminal arrest rate in terms
of denial.).
40. Id. at 150-57.
41. The trauma resulting from a child's involvement with the legal system may be more
debilitating than the sexual misuse itself. L. SCHULTZ, THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF
YOUTH 163-67, 248 (1980).
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"child victim friendly. 42 These changes include the creation of statu-
tory hearsay exceptions, 43 the exclusion of spectators from the court-
room,"4 and the admissibility of closed circuit 45 or videotaped46
testimony. These innovations have allayed some of the concerns
regarding the psychological impact on the child from involvement
with the legal system.47
B. Expert Witness Roles
The role assumed by the expert witness in the litigation is a fac-
tor in determining admissibility. Yet commentators and cases gener-
ally do not address the expert's role,48 nor is it clearly understood by
most experts. Five possible roles for an expert witness, derived from
legal and psychological practice, are introduced below. The legal
merit of each is addressed in Section II(H).
One jurisdiction permits the psychologist to testify as to the cred-
ibility of the child's testimony regarding the occurrence of the misuse
and the identity of the offender.4 9 Because the child is likely to be a
witness, the expert, in effect, is employed to testify as to the credibility
of another witness, the expert assuming the role of adviser to the jury
on the weight that they should place upon the testimony before them.
Commentators have identified this role as the liberal view, and one
that has not been widely adopted. 50
Another approach permits the expert to testify regarding the
results of a psychological evaluation of the child and to determine
whether the psychological status of the child is consistent with having
been subjected to sexual misuse by an adult.5 The evaluation itself
may include a determination as to whether the child's behavior pat-
42. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 27-
29 (1985); Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 5, 7-10 (1985).
43. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1987).
44. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1977).
45. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Baldwin 1986).
46. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 42.53 (1987); see also MacFarlane, supra note 31, at 143-54
(exploration of the legal implications of the use of videotaped testimony in child sexual misuse
cases).
47. These innovations, however, have created other problems, the most notable being the
conflict with the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to confront his accuser. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; see Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 534-54
(1988).
48. But see Roe, supra note 19.
49. See State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 608-10, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338-39 (1982).
50. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 19, at 104 (discussing Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330
(1982)).
51. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
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terns are consistent with a syndrome 2 or a diagnosis. 3 This role is
directly analogous to the approach taken by most courts with regard
to the admission of testimony by a treating physician. 4 The expert
will identify symptoms of psychological injury and will report the
behavior patterns observed during the examination of the child. Fur-
ther, the expert will present a professional opinion as to whether these
observations are indicative of a diagnosis or are consistent with the
occurrence of a particular event. The expert thereby indirectly sup-
ports or impeaches the veracity of other witnesses.
A third approach calls upon the expert to present the behavior
patterns and psychological symptoms associated with sexual misuse,
without having evaluated the victim. The expert may respond to a
hypothetical question that incorporates specific facts of the case. 55
This role for psychological experts in child sexual misuse cases is a
variation of the approach that many jurisdictions take with regard to
traditional medical expert testimony. Rather than serve as a gatherer
of facts, as in the second role discussed above, the expert applies sci-
entific knowledge to either the hypothetical facts presented or to the
facts admitted into evidence.
The fourth approach is similar to the third in that the expert does
not evaluate the child. Under this scheme, the expert's testimony is
restricted to a discussion of general principles, leaving the application
of these principles to the trier of fact.5 6 This approach is essentially
an educational model, in which the expert's testimony educates the
trier of fact.57
. The fifth and final approach allows the expert to present the
child's testimony, which was elicited by the expert under reasonably
controlled conditions and preserved.58 The expert may assist the
court in the interpretation of the preserved testimony when its mean-
ing is not self-evident 9.5  The expert thus assumes the role of preserver
of perishable testimony-a role that has been assumed by the experts
52. Note, The Syndrome Syndrome, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37 (1985).
53. The American Psychiatric Association publishes the authoritative reference manual
for the diagnosis of mental disorders. DSM-III-R, supra note 35.
54. Commentators generally discuss this approach with reference to the admissibility of
testimony involving the child sex abuse syndrome. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 19, at i08-11; see
also infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, -, 487 A.2d 664, 669 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985), vacated on other grounds, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
56. State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 1987).
57. One commentator has labeled this approach the "middle approach." See Roe, supra
note 19, at 106-07.
58. Expert's may preserve testimony by videotaping all the contacts between the child and
the therapist. See infra note 220.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 220-22.
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and accepted by. the courts sub silen tio. This is a necessary subcom-
ponent of the second role identified above. The clinical expert must
elicit the child's verbal and nonverbal behavior in order to evaluate
the child. For this evaluation to be meaningful, the methods and con-
ditions must be reasonably controlled. As presently conducted, how-
ever, this testimony is most often preserved in a haphazard fashion,
subject to the need of the evaluator to support the evaluation. This
Comment, as further discussed in Section III, suggests that this role
be recognized explicitly as a role for the expert psychological witness
and that the expert testimony be substantively admissible as an excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay.
C. Issues in the Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in
Sexual Misuse Cases
Many factors affect the court's decision as to whether to allow
the psychological expert to testify, regardless of which role the expert
assumes. These factors encompass the expert's qualifications, the reli-
ability and relevance of the expert's testimony, and the province of the
trier of fact.
The testimony of experts is admissible if it will aid the trier of
fact in its consideration of a fact of consequence. 60 The court must
determine whether the expert's proffered testimony will either aid or
hinder the trier of fact in its fulfillment of the assigned task.61 The
standard for admissibility of expert witness testimony provided by the
Federal Rules of Evidence allows judicial discretion in this determina-
tion.62 Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion, the court's ruling on
the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness will stand. The
60. FED. R. EvID. 702. The rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." See United States v. St. Pierre, 812
F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1987) ("A fundamental test for the admission of expert testimony is
whether it will assist the jury in resolving the factual issues before it."). "Three prerequisites
must be satisfied before the [expert] witness may testify: (1) the witness must be an expert; (2)
there must be facts in evidence which require or are subject to expert analysis; and (3) the
knowledge of the expert must be in a field where knowledge belongs more to experts than to
the common man." People v. Beckley, 161 Mich. App. 120, 124-25, 409 N.W. 2d 759, 761
(1987) (citing People v. Barr, 156 Mich. App. 450, 456, 402 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1986)).
61. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a). This rule provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness ... or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court .... " Id.
62. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 435, 510 A.2d 735, 739 (1986),
appeal granted, 515 Pa. 574, 527 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1987); Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1072
(Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); see also Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility
and Rape, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 433 (1985).
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first action by the court in the process of deciding whether to admit
the testimony of an expert is to examine the expert's qualifications.
D. Psychological Expertise
The Federal Rules of Evidence define an expert only in general
terms. Rule 702 provides that "a witness [be] qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. ' 63 Expert testi-
mony of the types identified above"4 has been presented by physi-
cians,65  crisis counselors,66  social workers,67  police officers,68
psychologists 69 and others70 in cases involving the sexual misuse of
children. The expert is qualified through experience with victims of
sexual misuse,7' professional training and experience not specific to
sexual misuse, 72 familiarity with the professional literature,73 and sci-
entific expertise developed through research. 74 The expert is qualified
by possession of at least one of these attributes.75
Published opinions rarely, if ever, contain discussions about the
relevance of the expert's qualifications to the proffered testimony. Yet
the connection between an expert's testimony and the expert's qualifi-
cations is an important logical nexus. To illustrate, although the
range of expertise possessed by psychologists does not include exper-
tise in the judgment of the truthfulness of a witness, the testimony of
psychologists has been proffered to establish the truthfulness of the
testimony of a sexual assault victim. 76
The field to which psychological experts apply their specialized
skills is defined broadly. If one begins with the major premise that the
63. FED. R. EvID. 702.
64. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986).
66. People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 172-73, 395 N.W.2d 274, 275 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986).
67. Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987).
68. People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577-78, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-05 (1984);
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1987).
69. Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 311-12, 692 S.W.2d 769, 770-71 (1985).
70. E.g., Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735 (1986) (A nurse
with a doctorate, clinical experience, and relevant research experience is qualified to diagnose
rape trauma syndrome.).
71. See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577-78, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-
05 (1984).
72. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
73. State v. Hazeltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96-97, 352 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1984).
74. Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
75. State v. Teeter, 85 N.C. App. 624, -, 355 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1987).
76. A basic premise for forming the therapeutic relationship is to accept the genuineness of
the patient's complaint. People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48
(1985).
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psychologist is an expert in human behavior and with the minor
premise that the decision whether to tell a lie or whether to tell the
truth is a behavioral choice that is uniquely human, then one must
deduce that the psychologist is an expert in truthfulness.
The error in this deduction lies in ascribing expertise to the psy-
chologist in the entire field of human behavior. The psychologist,
rather, has two distinct areas of expertise within the broad field of
human behavior. One of these is the clinical study of the individual."'
The other is the scientific study of behavior.7 These two distinct
areas of expertise have different legal consequences in a case involving
the sexual misuse of a child.
1. THE CLINICAL EXPERT
The intuitive basis for the qualification of a mental health expert
is his or her clinical skill and training. A treating clinician will note
the presence or absence of various symptoms and will diagnose the
existence of a mental disorder. The clinician will observe particular
psychological injuries, and may form a hypothesis about their origin.
The hypothesis will be based upon the correspondence of the state-
ments to the expert for the purpose of diagnosis and manifest symp-
toms of the injury noted. In this regard, the mental health expert is
not different from a treating medical expert.7 9 The Federal Rules of
Evidence provide a hearsay exception for statements made to a health
care professional for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.80
Such statements may also be admitted when the diagnosis or treat-
ment is conducted by a properly qualified psychological expert.8 1 The
77. Psychology has a Janus face. One face looks to psychotherapeutic practice, while the
other looks to empirical research. These two "faces" of the discipline interact but do not
overlap. See generally Forsyth & Strong, The Scientific Study of Counseling and
Psychotherapy, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113 (1986) (proposes a theoretical structure to increase
the level of interaction between practicing clinicians and the empirical study of their practice).
78. Id.
79. Courts generally admit hearsay statements made to someone other than a physician if
made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of a physical or psychological ailment. See,
e.g., State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 354 S.E.2d 527 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (Hearsay testimony
of a psychologist was admitted.); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A.2d
735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (Hearsay testimony of a nurse was admitted.).
80. FED. R. EvID. 803(4). See, e.g., State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 452, 349 S.E.2d 684, 685-
86 (1986), State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76 (1986); see also People v. Draper, 150
Mich. App. 481, 486, 389 N.W.2d 89, 91-92 (1986) (A young child's out-of-court assertion
uttered to physician one week after alleged incident of sexual misuse was admitted as an
excited utterance hearsay exception rather than as a medical diagnosis hearsay exception.). It
ought to be noted, however, that courts have not addressed whether the rationale which
underlies the medical diagnosis hearsay exception is applicable to a young child.
81. See State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, -, 354 S.E.2d 527,1536 (1987). But see State v.
Stafford, 77 N.C. App. 19, 334 S.E.2d 799 (1985), aff'd, 317 N.C. 568, 342 S.E.2d 338 (1986)
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issue that is posed by the admission of expert testimony by a treating
clinician is whether such a clinician may present conclusions based
upon a combination of hearsay, personal knowledge that resulted
from diagnosis and treatment, and scientific knowledge obtained
through the study of psychology. 2
The issue is analogous to the admissibility of expert medical testi-
mony by a treating physician in a stabbing case. The expert may tes-
tify as to the diagnosis and existence of a wound, what the victim said
were the circumstances that led to the injury, and whether these hear-
say statements are, in the expert's opinion, consistent with the injuries
noted during the diagnosis or treatment. The expert may also discuss
aspects of the wound in a way that may serve to limit the class of
potential assailants.8 3  Expert psychological testimony in a case
involving the sexual misuse of a child should be admissible by
analogy.
A clinically qualified expert may describe the child's psychologi-
cal injury because such testimony is based on the expert's personal
knowledge.8 4 This description may include a recitation of hearsay
statements made by the victim to the clinician for the purpose of for-
mulating a diagnosis or initiating treatment.8 5 The clinician may tes-
tify as to whether symptoms of a psychological injury were detected
in the process of evaluation.86 Further, the expert may comment as to
whether the symptoms detected are consistent with the explanation of
the events that allegedly caused the injury. 7
(medical diagnosis hearsay exception not admissible if the examination was conducted for the
purpose of going to trial).
82. The court must exclude the testimony by a treating medical expert if the testimony is
offered pursuant to a medical diagnosis hearsay exception and neither the medical diagnosis
nor treatment is affected by the content of the hearsay statement. Compare State v. Aguallo,
318 N.C. 590, 597, 350 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (1986) (A child's identification of the alleged sexual
offender during psychological diagnosis and treatment was admissible as a hearsay exception
because the treatment of the child will differ if the offender and the child are related.) with
State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (A child's identification of the
alleged defendant during medical evaluation was not admissible because it was not relevant to
the physician's diagnosis or treatment.).
83. Although evidence that excludes a class of individuals may be admitted, evidence that
attributes blame on the basis of membership may not be admitted. Sloan v. State, 70 Md. App.
630, 522 A.2d 1364 (1987).
84. Assuming that relevance can be established, a witness may testify as to matters of
which they have personal knowledge. State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, -, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366
(1987); FED. R. EvID. 602.
85. State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, -, 354 S.E.2d 527, 535 (1987); FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
86. See Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 852, 353 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1987); Kennedy, 320 N.C.
at _, 357 S.E.2d at 366.
87. A treating expert, when questioned as to whether the injury noted is consistent with a
particular cause, is responding to a variant of the classical hypothetical question in which the
basis of the expert's judgment need not be made explicit to the trier of fact. The court will
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The expert clinician may also comment on whether a medical
diagnosis was formulated.88 Yet the case law concerning the sexual
misuse of children does not specify what constitutes a diagnosis. 9 In
general, diagnosis is the identification of the underlying cause and the
pathological process, through an examination of symptoms. 90 In
determining what constitutes a diagnosis the medical community
relies upon formal manuals issued by official bodies91 in accordance
with standards pronounced by the World Health Organization.92 In
the field of psychology, in particular, the medical community has cre-
ated standard objective criteria to determine whether a pattern of
symptoms constitutes a diagnosis.93 Thus, lawyers, when relying
upon the presentation of a medical expert witness, are justified in
assuming that the expert will apply the standard of the medical pro-
fession in making a medical diagnosis. An evaluation that purports to
be a diagnosis but does not meet the standard set by the medical com-
munity should not be admissible.
Some jurisdictions have admitted into evidence a diagnosis of
"child sex abuse syndrome." 94 A syndrome, however, is not consid-
grant opposing counsel the opportunity to explore the expert's basis and may challenge the
expert's foundation. See Kennedy, 320 N.C. at -, 357 S.E.2d at 366; State v. Teeter, 85 N.C.
App. 624, -, 355 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1987) (The trial court overruled an objection that the
expert exceeded the bounds of psychological expertise when the expert opined that the
behavioral characteristics exhibited by the victim were consistent with sexual abuse.); FED. R.
EvID. 703, 705.
88. See 2 J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 60-
145 (3d ed. 1981) (addressing the method of entering a diagnosis into evidence as a component
of the deposition and cross-examination of a psychological expert).
89. The literature on diagnosis and classification in general is voluminous and complex.
See e.g., V. RAKOFF, H. STANCER, & H. KEDWARD, PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS (1977)
(collection of essays on the issues involved in diagnosis).
90. See, e.g., State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1063-64 (Me.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
199 (1986) (Diagnosis of a "puffing syndrome," a behavior pattern in which an individual self-
aggrandizes and is therefore unreliable, should have been admitted.).
91. E.g., DSM-III-R, supra note 35.
92. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: MANUAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, INJURIES, AND CAUSES OF DEATH (9th rev. 1977); see also
DSM-III-R supra note 91, at app. D (discussion of the interrelationship between the
psychiatric classification manual and the international standard).
93. See DSM-III-R, supra note 35.
94. Courts discuss the behavior patterns typically exhibited by a sexually misused child
under various labels, such as child sexual abuse syndrome, child abuse accommodation
syndrome, post abuse sexual syndrome, and child molest syndrome. These labels all appear to
represent the same phenomenon: Children who have been sexually misused behave differently
from children who have not been misused. Typical of the formulation of the child sexual abuse
syndrome found in the legal practice is that reported at length by the court in People v. Grady:
(T]he "Syndrome" has five distinct phases that are associated with it, as well as
symptoms or behavioral manifestations and coping mechanisms that have been
observed in sexually abused children.
The first phase, the "engagement phase," is when the offender seeks out
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friendly contact with the child, which can include various kinds of "affectional
behavior" such as allowing the child to sit in the offender's lap. It is during the
second phase, the "sexual interaction phase," that the sexual abuse actually
occurs. This "sexual interaction phase", [sic] often overlaps in part, the third, or
"secrecy" phase, in which the offender seeks to prevent the child from disclosing
the sexual abuse. During this phase the level of threats against the child begins
to increase. Such threats may include threats against a member of the child's
family, or a threat that the child will get in "trouble", [sic] or actual violence
directed against the child. Following the "secrecy" phase is the "disclosure"
phase. It is characterized either as "purposeful disclosure," which is relatively
rare and which occurs when the child intentionally relates the sexual offense to
someone else, or "accidental disclosure" which usually occurs when someone
notices a change in the child's behavior, leading to questions which prompt the
child to disclose the sexual offense. Apparently, "accidental disclosure" is the
most common revelation of child sexual abuse.
Finally, after the disclosure, the child enters the "suppression" phase. It is
at this time that the psychological defenses become operative. In this regard, as
[the expert witness] testified in explaining that children often suppress in-
formation about sexual abuse: "one needs to understand that once a child sex
abuse case is disclosed, all of a sudden, all kinds of adults are marching into the
life of a child. You have the police, you have the District Attorney, you have the
Family Court personnel, you have family members who are very upset, you have
school people, you have a whole bunch of folks now asking this youngster what
happened.... Families are usually under a great deal of strife when this secret
has been broken, so that in a suppression phase, very often you will see a child
holding back, the child will decide I am not going to talk about this, this is too
much pressure.., or you sometimes get recantation... [.] Sometimes that is an
intellectual strategy on the part of the child, to send all these people away.., it is
too much stress for them to have to deal with all these people now in their lives."
This phase is often characterized by denial, or in other words, "suppression
basically means shutting down, trying to keep things back". [sic] Sexually
abused children also undergo a wide variety of symptoms: regressive behavior;
bed wetting; bowel movements in their pants, although previously toilet trained;
regression to infantile separation anxieties; a new inability to cope with
previously achieved self-help skills, with the result that the child requires the
mother's help again. These children also begin displaying other previously
unexperienced behavior: temper tantrums beyond what had been normal;
hyperactivity or withdrawal; exaggerated fear levels, such as fear of men or fear
of locations where the sexual offense took place; inappropriate sexual play with
peers, toys, or dolls, including touching themselves in an inappropriate manner;
sexually oriented conversation; detailed and inappropriate-for their age-sexual
knowledge; eating disorders; sleeping disorders, or a fear of sleeping alone;
nightmares; flashbacks, crying spells, resulting from lowered frustration
thresholds. Furthermore, since a child of young age is unlikely to possess
detailed sexual knowledge, his or her description of sexual intercourse, or oral or
anal sodomy, is usually evidence that the child had, somehow, viewed explicit
sexual activity or materials, or, more likely, was sexually abused.
133 Misc. 2d 211, 214-16, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924-25 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (ellipsis in original).
A psychologist may testify as to the components of a child sexual abuse syndrome as long
as he does not rely upon an analysis of the facts of the particular case, nor venture an opinion
as to the validity of the child's accusation of inappropriate sexual contact. People v. Gray, 187
Cal. App. 3d 213, 218-20, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-61 (1986). The Grady court equated the
child sex abuse syndrome and other syndrome testimony ruled admissible in New York:
The 'Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome' should be considered with other syndromes,
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ered a diagnosis by the medical community; 95 rather, it is a collection
of related symptoms.96 Whether the pattern of symptoms can consti-
tute a diagnosis is determined in part by whether a common underly-
ing pathological process can be identified as the causal agent of the
pattern of symptoms. 97 Further, the underlying pathological process
must be recognized as a disorder within a standard diagnostic man-
ual. 98 The symptom pattern is not assigned the label of a diagnosis,
but rather, the symptom pattern is evidence of the underlying patho-
logical process to which it is causally connected. For these reasons, it
is not medically proper to diagnose the existence of a syndrome.
2. THE CHILD SEX ABUSE SYNDROME
The sexual abuse syndrome embodies the notion that a traumatic
event results in detectable behavior changes and assumes that the
behavior patterns so caused are both meaningful and consistent. The
testimony of an expert on the existence of child sex abuse syndrome
assumes the existence of a single set of symptoms and behaviors that
are associated with sexual misuse.99 This latter assumption is not
valid. The psychological symptoms associated with a child who was
attacked and raped by a stranger, for example, are different from the
symptoms of a child who was the victim of an exhibitionist. Both of
these symptoms are in turn different from the symptoms of a child
such as... 'Rape Trauma Syndrome,' 'Battered Child Syndrome,' and 'Battered
Wife Syndrome' that explain the behavior of a crime victim, which does not
appear ordinary or normative. Expert evidence concerning these syndromes,
which are analogous to the Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome, generally has been
admitted as reliable and helpful to the factfinder.
Grady, 133 Misc. 2d at 216, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
95. The syndrome with which lay persons are most familiar is Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Medical and lay persons alike speak of individuals with a
"diagnosis of AIDS." Yet, when accuracy and formality is important, physicians will present
the diagnosis as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), and may separately diagnose the
individual opportunistic infections that are components of the AIDS syndrome. The collection
of symptoms, known as a syndrome, is not accepted as a diagnosis. The medical community
originally used the label AIDS because the common underlying pathological process had not
been identified. See also Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa. Super. 477, 484-85, 528 A.2d
610, 614 (1987) (Battered child syndrome has become an accepted medical diagnosis and
serves to diagnose the underlying pathological agent that causes the child's multiple injuries.).
96. J. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 529 (1975).
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. Psychologists have criticized the medical community for being overly protective of
access to the power to create "official" diagnoses. See, e.g., McLemore & Benjamin, What
Ever Happened to Interpersonal Diagnosis?, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 17, 17-19 (1979); Schacht
& Nathan, But Is It Good for the Psychologist?, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1017, 1017-21 (1977).
99. The definition of a syndrome specifies that the symptoms or personality traits that
make up the syndrome must be related. J. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 529
(1975).
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who was the victim of incest."° Further, depending upon a multiplic-
ity of factors, the impact upon the child could be quite different even
within a single category. In a case of father-daughter incest, for
example, such factors as the number of episodes and the time period
over which the incestuous relationship took place affect the nature
and extent of psychological impact upon the child.' In addition, the
impact upon the child will vary depending upon the nature of the
sexual misuse to which the child was subjected, ranging from
voyeuristic perversions to fondling, masturbation, and intercourse.102
Further, because the adult who misuses a child typically will employ
some method to encourage the child not to communicate with others
about the sexual contact, 103 the impact will vary depending upon
whether the offender threatened the child with physical harm, bribed
the child with attention or material possessions, or threatened to hurt
other members of the child's family.'" The effect of public disclosure
of an incident of sexual misuse upon both the child and the child's
family will also produce psychological symptoms in the child
100. The syndrome is based on clinical experience with victims of intrafamilial sexual
misuse. Factors such as delay in disclosure and the psychological sequel to the breach of trust
play an important role in the syndrome. Nonetheless, experts have "diagnosed" the existence
of the syndrome to children who were not misused within a family setting. E.g., People v.
Grady, 133 Misc. 2d at 212, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (offender was a minister).
101. The syndrome was designed for circumstances in which the child was unable to
discontinue the adult's inappropriate sexual behavior after the first incident. Twenty-five
percent of daughters who are sexually misused by their fathers, however, are able to stop the
inappropriate behavior after one incident. K. MEISELMAN, INCEST 165 (1979). If single-event
cases are excluded from analysis, the average length of a sexually inappropriate relationship
between a father and his daughter is three and one half years. It is this pattern upon which the
syndrome data was originally based. Id; see also In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1987). See generally Rofsky, Effects of Father-Daughter Incest on the Personality of
Daughters, 40 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 2386 (1979) (empirical study of factors that
impact the effect of incest upon the daughter).
102. The precise nature of the abuse has an effect on the psychological defense mechanisms
that the child may employ to protect his or her psychological self worth and identity. See
MEISELMAN, supra note 101, at 140-261, passim.
103. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
104. The child who was threatened with severe physical harm may experience more of the
trauma reactions associated with the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. Guilt and
depressive reactions, however, would be less likely in this child. In contrast, the child who was
reinforced for the child's silence by gifts will tend to develop a brazen facade in order to hide a
profound sense of worthlessness. Children who have been manipulated in this way are at
significant risk of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as prostitution.
One method of encouraging the child to maintain secrecy is to convince the child to "go
along quietly" in order to avoid harm to family members. This occurs with surprising
frequency. The child is told that the offender will "leave her younger sister alone if she would
just .... " These children are predisposed to develop narcissistic, dependent and passive-
aggressive personality disorders. B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, TREATING SEXUALLY ABUSED
CHILDREN 33-69 (1983).
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victim. 10,
The child's age, level of intellectual and emotional functioning,
and other developmental characteristics also have an impact. 106 Each
potential combination of factors will produce a unique constellation of
symptoms. The number of possible symptom constellations is virtu-
ally infinite. This renders the concept of a single child sexual abuse
syndrome meaningless. Creation of a different child sex abuse syn-
drome to correspond with each symptom constellation would
approach the level of specificity of a hypothetical question. 10 7
The behavior patterns, or symptoms, associated with children
being misused are extremely diverse. They include, for example, the
polar opposites of behaving in an infantile or supermature fashion,
and displaying a slovenly disregard for outward appearance or dress-
ing precociously. The symptoms of sexual misuse are causally related
to both the pattern of misuse to which the child was subjected and the
personal characteristics of the child. 108
A psychological evaluation of behavior provides insight into its
causes. 109 Behavior patterns may evidence the existence of an underly-
ing pathological process to which a diagnosis may be validly
affixed. 10 The diagnosis, however, is more generic and less inflam-
105. Disclosure of father-daughter incest to the mother creates a crisis in the family,
whether the mother believes or denies her daughter's accusation. Burgess, Holmstrom &
McCausland, Divided Loyalty in Incest Cases, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 115 (1978). When the disclosure is made to authorities, the behavior of the
mother will be a significant determinant of the child's psychological well-being. Id.
106. Researchers have not systematically explored the impact of developmental factors in
creating variations in the behavior of sexually misused children. Clinicians, of course,
recognize that treatment must be tailored to the developmental level of the victims of sexual
misuse. B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, supra note 104, at 49-69. "Although there are patterns
that have been observed, the ongoing studies reveal that a host of variables contribute to the
effect of rape on its victims .. " People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 250-51, 681 P.2d 291, 301,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459-60 (1984). "[E]ach rape victim responds to and integrates the
experience differently depending upon her age, life situation, the circumstances of the rape, her
specific personal style, and the responses of those from whom she seeks support." Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d at 251 n.13, 681 P.2d at 301 n.13, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 n.13 (quoting Notman &
Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 408, 409
(1976)).
107. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (The expert's response
to questions was premised upon the validity of a particular set of facts.); People v. Grady, 133
Misc. 2d 211, 215-16, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925-26 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (A psychiatrist
"acknowledged, in response to a hypothetical question, that when called to the witness stand
in the courtroom, the conduct of a child in initially denying that a defendant, also present in
the courtroom, was the molester, could be consistent with the Syndrome.").
108. B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, supra note 104.
109. Behaviors and symptoms are meaningful. S. FREUD, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
EVERYDAY LIFE (1951).
110. Stressors are factors in the initiation or exacerbation of a majority of the psychiatric
diagnoses. DSM-III-R, supra note 35.
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matory than a diagnosis labeled "child sex abuse syndrome.' 11
These diagnoses include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)," 2
simple phobia,' 1 3 and the eight adjustment disorders, 4 depending
upon the pathological process that the sexual misuse initiated or exac-
erbated. Such a diagnosis is consistent with the occurrence of a trau-
matic event, but cannot distinguish between differing traumatic
causes.
The expertise of a clinician, through both formal training and
clinical practice, is limited to the treatment and diagnosis of a patient.
The clinician may form an opinion as to whether the patient has been
truthful based upon the patient's statements and symptoms.
Although the clinician may testify as to whether the symptoms are
consistent with the patient's described incidence of sexual misuse,'' 5
111. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984)
(The term "rape trauma syndrome" is likely to mislead the jury into believing that the
classification indicates a scientific judgment that the victim was raped.); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) ("There are inherent implications from the use of the term 'rape
trauma syndrome,' for it suggests that the syndrome may only be caused by 'rape' ....");
Townsend v. State, - Nev. -, 734 P.2d 705, 708-09 (1987) (Diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder for a child victim of sexual assault is admissible.); State v. Bowman, 104 N.M.
19, 22, 715 P.2d 467, 470 (Ct. App. 1986) (Evidence was properly excluded when the
prosecutor insisted upon the term "rape trauma syndrome" even though the psychologist
repeatedly stated a preference for the less emotionally charged term "post-traumatic stress
disorder."); see also State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 253, 719 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Ct. App. 1986)
(Referring to the term "battered wife syndrome," the court concluded that it saw "no reason
for excluding use of a recognized term to describe the phenomenon.").
112. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) requires the existence of a recognizable stressor
that would evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost everyone: a reexperiencing of the
trauma, a reduction of involvement with the external world, and certain other specific
symptoms. DSM-III-R, supra note 35, at 247-51. Note that the diagnostic requirement of
PTSD requires the existence of a significant stressor, such as rape or sexual misuse. It is
circular to assert the diagnosis of PTSD as evidence of the occurrence of the stressor (the rape
or the sexual misuse) when the diagnosis requires an assumption of the occurrence of the
stressful event. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (The diagnosis
of PTSD was admissible in a child sexual misuse case to explain the victim's change of
behavior.).
113. The predominant feature of simple phobia is a persistent and irrational fear. It is
recognized as being a learned condition, usually as a result of the pairing of a traumatic event
with the feared object. DSM-III-R, supra note 35, at 243.
114. A common requirement among all of the adjustment disorders is the existence of an
identifiable social stressor in the life of the patient within three months of the onset of the
symptoms. The patient must be impaired as a consequence of the adjustment disorder. The
particular symptom pattern of the patient determines the proper diagnosis. Id. at 329.
115. A majority of jurisdictions have ruled that evidence regarding the consistency of a
child's behavior with the behavior pattern typically displayed by victims of sexual misuse is
admissible under certain circumstances. See United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419-20
(8th Cir. 1987) (A clinical psychologist can testify as to the traits and characteristics of
sexually abused children generally, and may compare these to the alleged victim in the case.);
Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (An expert may testify that
the victims were "no different" from the exploited children who the expert had interviewed in
1988]
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the expert may not present an opinion regarding the truthfulness of
the victim or anyone else.16
his studies of victims.); State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 384, 728 P.2d 248, 254 (1986) (A
psychological expert may testify regarding factors impacting recantation and may provide an
explanation for the victim's anger.); People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367, 1369-70, (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) (An expert may testify as to the consistency of an alleged victim's behavior with a
pattern typically displayed by a child incest victim for the purpose of rebuttal.); Kruse v. State,
483 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("[T]he gist of ... [the] testimony was that the
victim's reported behavioral changes were consistent with her report of sex abuse."); Allison v.
State, 256 Ga. 851, 853-54, 353 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1987) (The expert may present the
components of child sex abuse syndrome, and testify as to the consistency of the child's
behavior with the syndrome.); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 154-55, 730 P.2d 1069, 1074-
75 (Ct. App. 1986) (An expert may testify as to the tendency of children to delay disclosure of
an incident of sexual misuse.); People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 19, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406
(1983) (A rape counselor was not acting as a "human lie detector" when she gave her opinion
as to whether a complainant's behavior was consistent with having been raped.); State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (Minn. 1984) (A psychologist was permitted to testify as to
both the traits and characteristics typically found in sexually abused children, and those that
were similar in the complainant.); State v. Shackelford, 719 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) ("Properly qualified, an expert in the psycological testing field may testify that the
patient, client, or victim does possess and exhibit the characteristics consistent with those
resulting from a traumatic stress reaction such as rape.") (quoting State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 240 (Mo. 1984)); Townsend v. State, - Nev. -, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (1987) (An expert
may express an opinion as to whether a child was sexually abused.); People v. Keindl, 68
N.Y.2d 410, 422, 502 N.E.2d 577, 583, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 796 (1986) ("[T]he range of
psychological reactions of child victims who suffer from sexual abuse at the hands of their
stepparents is not a subject matter within the ken of the typical juror .. "); State v. Teeter, 85
N.C. App. 624, -, 355 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1987) (The expert may testify as to the consistency of
a mentally retarded victim's behavioral characteristics and symptoms of sexual misuse, and
may present the trier of fact with the basis of his judgment.); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, -
, 357 S.E.2d 359, 365-66 (1987) (An expert may testify concerning the symptoms and
characteristics of sexually abused children, and may state an opinion that the symptoms are
consistent with sexual or physical abuse.); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 415-16, 587 P.2d
1044, 1047 (1978) (An expert may testify that the victim's behavior comported with the
behavior of most women that come to the hospital alleging sexual assault.); State v. Middleton,
294 Or. 427, 435-38, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220-21 (1983) (A qualified expert may testify as to
whether the reaction of one child is similar to the reaction of most victims of familial child
abuse.); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1114-15, 1125-28 (Wyo. 1987) (A clinical psychologist
was allowed to describe the typical pattern of behavior of participants in father-daughter
incest, and venture her opinion as to whether the child was a victim of sexual molestation.);
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1044-48 (Wyo. 1987) (Behavioral characteristics of sexual
assault victims are admissible to rebut defenses that delay was inconsistent with nonconsensual
sexual assault.). But see Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986)
(Testimony that the victim fit the pattern of sexual abuse accommodation syndrome should
not have been admitted because it did not meet the Frye standard of reliability.); State v.
McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (It was fundamental error to admit testimony that
behavior of rape victim was consistent with rape trauma syndrome for purpose of rebutting a
defendant's claim of consent.).
116. Testimony as to a witness' character for truthfulness is permitted. FED. R. EvID. 608.
An expert, however, is generally considered to be incapable of testifying as to someone else's
character for truthfulness. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); State v.
Chul Yun Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 619-22, 350 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1987).
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3. THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BEHAVIOR
The second area of expertise for psychologists within the field of
human behavior is the scientific study of behavior. Both parties in a
sexual misuse case can call an expert witnesses to testify about sexual
misuse in general. ' 7 The expert, never having seen the alleged vic-
tim," does not testify as to whether the child fits the behavior pattern
associated with the sexual misuse of children, but rather describes the
behavior patterns associated with sexual misuse. ' ' 9 Such an expert is
qualified through mastery of a specialized field of knowledge about a
group of either children who have been sexually misused,' 2° or adults
who have sexually misused children.' 2 '
Although the expert testifies to symptoms in general, the infor-
mation that the expert divulges can vary widely. The expert may dis-
cuss the tendency of victims to postpone disclosure of the
inappropriate and illegal activity for a period of days, weeks, or
years.' 22 The expert may explain that a child's pattern of retracting' 23
or changing the complaint does not correlate with fabrication. 24 Fur-
ther, the expert can explain the psychological dynamics that contrib-
ute to such behavior in children. 25 Experts have been asked to testify
about the personal, demographic, or behavioral attributes associated
with sexual offenders of children, although such testimony generally
has not been admitted.' 26  Whether expert testimony is admitted
depends in part on the reason for which the testimony is offered.
117. E.g., California v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
118. E.g., Eastman v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); People
v. Grady, 133 Misc. 2d 211, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
119. State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Minn. 1987) (Expert testimony on direct
examination as to behavioral characteristics generally associated with sexually misused
adolescents is admissible.); Grady, 133 Misc. 2d at 213, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 924 ("The evidence is
... admissible.., to understand the psychological aftermath occasioned by the trauma, such
as false recantations and feelings of guilt and apprehension about the trial.").
120. E.g., Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 373-74, 502 A.2d 253, 255
(1985); see also United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (comparing the
situation in which the expert testifies as to the credibility of a particular witness to one in
which the expert testifies about behavior patterns of victims as a class).
121. Sloan v. State, 70 Md. App. 630, 522 A.2d 1364 (1987); State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d
1, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987).
122. E.g., People v. Foreman, 161 Mich. App. 14, 23-24, 410 N.W.2d 289, 294 (1987) (A
social worker may testify that delays of more than a month between an incidence of abuse and
the disclosure thereof are not uncommon.); People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 395
N.W.2d 274 (1986).
123. See Potter v. State, 410 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing family
pressure that may lead a child to recant an accusation of incest).
124. Oregon v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
125. Eastman v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
126. Sloan v. State, 70 Md. App. 630, -, 522 A.2d 1364, 1368-69 (1987) (Comparison of
offender to a profile of typical offenders is not admissible to show guilt by association.).
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Scientific experts derive their specialized knowledge from behav-
ioral group studies. 12  A properly conducted study yields data that
will allow an expert to predict confidently how a similarly constituted
group would behave under similar circumstances. 121 With this infor-
mation, the expert can formulate an opinion as to the probability that
an individual will behave in a specific manner given a particular set of
events. 2 9
Statistical information generally is not admissible to establish an
ultimate fact if the fact to be established is the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of a discrete event. 30 The occurrence of an event must be
determined by evidence of the event. '3' It is a logical error to reach a
conclusion about the existence of a thing based upon the probability
of its occurrence. All that may be determined by the introduction of
probability data is the likelihood of an event occurring. Knowledge,
for example, that the probability of a negligently discharged gun caus-
ing a particular death is extremely low does not change the fact that
the victim may indeed have died in this very manner. Similarly,
knowledge that the probability of a household possessing at least one
television is extremely high does not change the fact that an individ-
ual does not have one.
Statistical information that is inadmissible to establish the occur-
127. See generally J. MYERS, FUNDAMENTALS OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN (3d ed. 1979);
see also In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1987); People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 247 n.8, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 n.8, 681 P.2d 291, 298 n.8 (1984) (regarding the
origin of the term "rape trauma syndrome").
128. The ability to generalize from an experimental group depends upon the experimental
design. See T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION 37-91 (1979).
129. Predictive validity depends upon the experiment's statistical model, the error
coefficient, and the accuracy of the embedded assumptions. J. WARD & E. JENNINGS,
INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR MODELS 66-68 (1979).
130. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 131, 489 N.E.2d 795, 803 (1986).
131. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas, when confronted with expert testimony comparing
the characteristics of a typical case involving sexual misuse to the facts in the case before it,
ruled the expert testimony inadmissible, stating:
It is our conclusion from the record in the case before us that the evidence of the
expert, . . . tended to focus the attention of the jury upon whether the evidence
against the defendant matched the evidence in the usual case involving sexual
abuse of a young child. Much of the expert's testimony highlighted details that
were parallel to the details in the case at hand .... [W]e feel this type of evidence
was not of proper benefit to the jury in this case .... [Ilt was not introduced to
rebut a misconception about the presumed behavior of a rape victim but to prove
... [that] the circumstances and details in this case match the circumstances and
details usually found in child abuse cases.
Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1985); see also State v. Moran,
151 Ariz. 378, 381, 728 P.2d 248, 251 (1986) (When the maxims of logic indicate the expert's
opinion is inherently unhelpful, then it is the court's responsibility to forbid its admissibility.).
See generally K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1968) (particularly the
chapters on probability and the problem of an empirical basis).
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rence of a fact of consequence, however, may be admissible to assist
the trier of fact in determining the probative value of a circumstantial
fact. 132 A statement by a psychologist that 70 percent of all sexually
misused children are sexually abused by their fathers, when offered to
provide incremental support for the conviction of the child's father, or
to support the exoneration of an alleged nonfamilial perpetrator, is
inadmissible. The testimony is irrelevant because it does not assist the
trier of fact in establishing whether this defendant committed the act
with which he is charged. Even if the proffered statistic was 99 per-
cent, the logical analysis would not change. 13 3 Nevertheless, such evi-
dence may be admissible for the purpose of modifying the commonly
understood probative value of a circumstantial fact. That is, for
example, if it is commonly believed that the typical sexual offender is
a nonfamily member and if that common belief is clearly erroneous,
then the testimony is nevertheless admissible to aid the trier of fact in
evaluating the impact of the relationship of the alleged offender and
victim as circumstantial evidence of guilt.
The purpose of an expert's testimony with respect to scientific
information is to provide information that is beyond the common
experience of the trier of fact and that will assist it in the determina-
tion of the probative value to be assigned to a circumstantial fact that
bears upon a fact of consequence. An example is a child's postponing
disclosure of the sexual misuse for a period of months or years.134 A
132. Probability analysis does not assist in efforts to establish the existence or nonexistence
of an event. The existence of a discrete event has a probability of either zero or one (the event
either exists completely or does not exist completely). Although the statistician may be able to
comment on the likelihood of an event occurring, the statistician cannot determine whether
the event did occur. Any attempt to do so would only be a statistically supported guess. See
R. WINKLER & W. HAYS, STATISTICS 420 (2d ed. 1975). Psychologists have also addressed
the role of probability data in litigation. For example, Professors Loftus and Monahan stated:
The response, it seems to us, is straightforward. The expert must agree that one
cannot be sure whether any particular witness is influenced by this factor or not.
The expert can only argue that a certain percentage of people are affected in a
particular way. The jury is then free, as it should be, to use whatever other
information it has available to make the final decision about whether the
particular witness or defendant is to be classified with the majority or the
minority on this particular characteristic. Put another way, probabilistic evidence
can be presented as such, with its application to a particular person left for the jury
to decide.
Loftus & Monahan, Trial by Data, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 270, 280 (1980).
133. A similar analysis applies to an expert's response to the question of whether children
lie or fantasize about sexual abuse, or whether the expert, in the expert's experience in treating
victims of sexual assault, has ever encountered a child that lied. Such testimony is generally
not admissible if offered in a party's case in chief for the purpose of supporting the credibility
of a witness.
134. See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804
(1984); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 372-73, 502 A.2d 253, 255 (1985);
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juror is likely to be incredulous upon hearing a defense attorney elicit
from the prosecution's chief witness, the child victim of misuse, that
the child delayed for an extended period of time before reporting the
abuse to anyone. Common experience teaches us that when a child
suffers an injury the child will tell an adult almost immediately.
Therefore, testimony of delay in reporting an abusive event would
serve as an indirect impeachment of the child's veracity. The prose-
cutor may call an expert to address this perception. The expert will
testify that a delay in reporting an incident of sexual misuse is a com-
mon occurrence among victims of sexual assault. 35 The defendant,
through his elicitation of testimony regarding delay in the reporting of
the incident of sexual misuse opened the door to the admission of the
prosecution's expert testimony.' 36 The defendant placed in issue the
proper interpretation of the elicited circumstantial fact: Whether
there exists a stronger correlation between delay in reporting and
fabrication than between delay in reporting and telling the truth. The
expert's role in such a case is to provide an opinion, based upon both
the statistical studies and their own clinical experience with patients
other than the victim, as to which correlation has more merit. 37
E. The Reliability of the Testimony
If the testimony of an expert does not meet the Frye v. United
States 31 standard of "concordance with a reliable body of scientific
knowledge," then it is likely to be inadmissible. 39 Concordance with
a reliable body of knowledge requires the existence of a reliable body
of explanatory principles, and reliable methods of gaining access to
these principles, as well as the proper application of these methods by
qualified individuals in the particular case.'" The court must make
Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 571-72, 688 P.2d 326, 326-27 (1984); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.
2d 566, 575-76, 683 P.2d 173, 179-80 (1984).
135. People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 177-78, 395 N.W.2d 274, 277 (1986).
136. Some courts will allow the prosecutor to question the expert as a rehabilitative witness
without requiring the defendant to first impeach the victim. The apparent rationale for this
practice is that the testimony of the child was self-impeaching through no fault of the
prosecutor.
137. The prohibition of direct consideration by the expert of the facts of the case at bar is
essential. The expert is called to educate the trier of fact as to general behavior patterns in
children who have been sexually misused. The expert should not state a personal opinion as to
the veracity of the child victim, but rather should present the trier of fact with sufficient
information to properly evaluate the child's veracity. See State v. Snapp, 110 Idaho 269, 271,
715 P.2d 939, 941 (1986).
138. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
139. Id.; see also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197, 1201 (1980). But see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
140. Giannelli, supra note 138, at 1201.
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the preliminary examination of the expert's testimony to ascertain
whether it is in concordance with a sufficiently reliable body of scien-
tific or technical knowledge.141
The Frye standard is employed in order to protect the trier of fact
from being confused or misled by the admission of expert witness evi-
dence that lacks a reliable scientific basis.'42 The trier of fact is
believed to place a great deal of reliance upon the testimony of
experts.'43 The trier of fact is likely to believe that a clinical evalua-
tion technique employed by an expert, such as the use of anatomically
correct dolls to evaluate a child for an incident of sexual abuse, is
valid.'" The defendant's introduction of experts to dispute the scien-
tific validity of the evaluation technique will not fully counter the
impact of the prosecution's witness, regardless of the actual validity of
either the underlying scientific principle or the method of implement-
ing it in practice. For these reasons, a foundation consisting of evi-
dence to support a finding of concordance with a reliable body of
scientific knowledge must be established before the expert may
testify. 1 45
The court will determine whether the foundation has been prop-
erly laid with reference to the Frye test, 146 as modified by interpreta-
tions within the particular jurisdiction. 147 A judge does not have
expertise in the evaluation of the scientific merit of either theory or
technique.148 Further, it is not a wise policy for the court to become a
forum for the debate-between competing scientific theories or meth-
ods. The forum for such debates is more appropriately left to the
professional journals and conferences that cater to the particular sci-
entific community. For these reasons, the Frye standard allows the
admission of expert testimony that relies upon a new scientific theory
141. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court ......
FED. R. EvID. 104(a). It is reasonable to consider the issue of reliability of the testimony as a
foundational test of relevance. See United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984).
142. Giannelli, supra note 138, at 1201.
143. Id. at 1240 n.318.
144. See Jampole & Weber, An Assessment of the Behavior of Sexually Abused and
Nonsexually Abused Children with Anatomically Correct Dolls, 11 J. CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 187-88 (1987); see also State v. Chul Yun Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 618-19, 350 S.E.2d
347, 350 (1986) (Testimony regarding evaluation with anatomically correct dolls was
admissible.); In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1987) (Expert's
testimony that relied upon the use of anatomically correct dolls is not admissible unless the
proponent establishes the scientific reliability of the procedure.).
145. United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977).
146. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
147. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1228-41 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. Kelly, 17
Cal. 3d 24, 30-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1976).
148. Giannelli, supra note 138, at 1208-23.
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or technique only if the theory or technique has received general
acceptance within the appropriate scientific community.149
Courts and commentators have criticized the Frye test as being
less than satisfactory.150 It tends to delay the introduction of new
scientific principles, and therefore may exclude reliable, relevant, and
probative expert testimony.15" ' The reliance upon the "general accept-
ance in the applicable scientific community" standard appears to con-
dition the admissibility of evidence upon a popularity vote within the
scientific community.5 2 Although this approach may accurately
reflect the sociology of the growth of scientific knowledge,' it is
unseemly to determine the admissibility of evidence based upon what
could be characterized as an unscientific poll of scientists. A further
complaint about the Frye test is the difficulty of determining which
scientific community is the appropriate base for comparison. 5 4 Natu-
rally, the selection of the reference group may determine the outcome.
As a result of these criticisms, some courts have relaxed the Frye stan-
dard of "general acceptance" to a standard of "substantial accept-
ance" of the scientific hypothesis or technique in the relevant
discipline. '55
The results of a clinical expert's evaluation may be admitted if
the techniques relied upon were validly administered and have
obtained substantial acceptance in the psychological community.
Whether the use of the child sex abuse syndrome as a tool for the
evaluation of a child is sufficiently accepted is not clear.' 56 Psycholog-
ical evaluations, however, generally consist of the application of well-
accepted clinical techniques to reach feelings, behaviors, and thought
149. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
150. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 85-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Giannelli, supra note 138, at
1204-28.
151. Giannelli, supra note 138, at 1223-24.
152. Id. at 1208-23.
153. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255, 257 n.4 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987).
155. The court, in United States v. Gould, consciously deviated from the standard of
general acceptance in the relevant scientific discipline, and adopted the more liberal standard
of substantial acceptance. 741 F.2d 45, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1984). The latter standard requires the
court to determine that a substantial body of support exists behind the proffered scientific
proposition within the relevant discipline. Id. at 49-50; accord United States v. Torniero, 735
F.2d 725, 731 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985). But see United States v.
McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cf United States v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255,
257 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987) (expressly
declining to follow the Gould test).
156. See McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and other Mental Exotica, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 41-44
(1987); Note, supra note 52, at 1046-57.
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processes. A substantial portion of the psychological community has
accepted these general clinical evaluation methods for a very long
time. The Frye test, although applicable, does not impose a significant
obstacle to the admission of such testimony.
Some courts have given the Frye standard cursory treatment in
cases involving the testimony of clinical experts. In People v. Beck-
ley, 1 5 1 for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the testi-
mony of a clinician as to whether the behavior of the child was
consistent with having been sexually misused was not an application
of a child sex abuse syndrome. The evaluation was considered an
application of generally accepted psychological methods, and there-
fore the scientific merit of the child sex abuse syndrome was not at
issue. The Frye test does not hinder the admissibility of a clinical
evaluation based upon common and well-accepted psychological
principles. 5 8
Courts have held that the American Psychiatric Association's
diagnostic system is substantially accepted in response to a Frye chal-
lenge to the reliability of a diagnostic evaluation. For example, Flor-
ida courts have admitted as reliable the clinical diagnosis of a child
victim in accordance with the diagnostic category of post-traumatic
stress disorder, when offered circumstantially to support an allegation
of sexual misconduct by the defendant.159
The California Court of Appeal has held that presentation of
general facts regarding a child sex abuse syndrome did not need to be
subjected to the standard of general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community.1 60 In People v. Gray the court indicated that the Frye
standard did not apply to cases in which testimony did not purport to
prove the occurrence of molestation.' 6' The expert in that case did
not seek to apply a new scientific process, but rather sought to give
the jury information with which to properly evaluate the probative
value of behavior patterns already in evidence.
The distinction drawn by the court in Gray 162 may be understood
by reference to the principle that distinguishes the fourth role for
157. 161 Mich. App. 120, 409 N.w.2d 759, 763 (1987).
158. Testimony regarding emotional and psychological trauma of a complaining witness is
admissible. People v. Skinner, 153 Mich. App. 815, 821-23, 396 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (1986).
The Frye test is applicable if the evidence is presented with an aura of scientific reliability. Id.
In Skinner, the expert did not testify that the characteristics exhibited by the victim
conclusively established that she had been sexually abused, and therefore the Frye test did not
hinder admission. Id.
159. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
160. People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 218-21, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661-62 (1986).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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expert witnesses'addressed above from the first three roles. 163 In the
first three roles, the expert applies clinical skills to the facts of the case
and delivers an opinion to the court. In the fourth role, however, the
expert does not apply his or her clinical expertise, but rather serves as
an educator. An expert testifying as to general facts obtained through
the application of traditional research methods is not applying new
scientific techniques. The expert, instead, is testifying as to facts
within either personal knowledge or contained in learned treatises rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the field. Therefore, the Frye test is
inapplicable in such a situation.
F. The Relevance of the Testimony
Reliable expert testimony may nevertheless be inadmissible un-
less it is proffered for a relevant purpose. 164 The Federal Rules of
Evidence define as relevant evidence any evidence that has "any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." 165 An expert witness may testify if
the testimony is relevant and within the expert's area of compe-
tence. 166 The expert may not testify if the purpose for which the testi-
mony is relevant does not relate to the expertise by which the expert is
qualified. 167
The testimony of an expert regarding behavior patterns typically
displayed by children who have been sexually misused will not be
excluded for lack of relevance if certain criteria are met. The testi-
mony must be offered for a relevant purpose. Typically, this is to
counter an express or implied accusation that the particular behavior
pattern is associated with fabrication. 6 The expert testimony is rele-
vant in such a case to establish the probative value of a circumstantial
fact-the child's behavior pattern-as it relates to the occurrence of
163. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
164. E.g., FED. R. Evir. 402; see also United States v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255, 257
(D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987) (The relevance
of expert testimony is a preliminary question of law that the court must decide within its
discretionary powers.). See generally Kruse, 483 So. 2d at 1384-85 (collapsing reliability
analysis into a relevancy analysis).
165. FED. R. EvID. 401.
166. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added).
167. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985).
168. An example of such a behavior pattern is the tendency of children to retract
accusations of sexual misconduct that they alleged against family members. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253 (1985).
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sexual misuse, which is the fact of consequence.1 69 Common knowl-
edge of this probative value must be either absent or mistaken.' 70
Finally, the expert must be qualified as possessing expertise in the
determination of the probative value of this circumstantial fact. 7'
Under such circumstances the expert should be permitted to testify
regarding the psychological significance of the child's behavior pat-
tern as it relates to the occurrence of sexual misuse.
A party may wish to introduce expert testimony for many pur-
poses. The same testimony may be admissible as relevant for one pur-
pose, but not for another. 72  For example, a party may wish to
introduce testimony by an expert as to the veracity of a child during a
psychological evaluation. Such testimony is relevant to the trier of
fact's determination of the weight it should place upon the psycholo-
gist's evaluation. 173 The expert's statement concerning the veracity of
the child, however, is not admissible if offered to prove the child's
credibility. Both offerings rely upon the clinician's evaluation of the
appropriateness of the child's sexual knowledge, emotional reactivity,
169. It is not clear whether the opposing party needs to elicit the testimony. Logically, the
party wishing to admit the expert testimony should have to show the admission of testimony
by the opposing party raising the issue of the probative value of the circumstantial fact. Some
jurisdictions, however, have allowed the admission of the prosecution's expert testimony after
the prosecution itself caused facts to be entered into evidence that circumstantially impeached
the credibility of the child. This may be explained by the constructive fiction of allowing the
rehabilitation of self-impeaching testimony. But see Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 312-16,
692 S.W.2d 769, 770-73 (1985) (Evidence that child's behavior and allegations matched a
"typical case of abuse" was not properly admitted because it was not introduced to rebut a
misconception about behavior of the alleged victim.).
170. If the knowledge of probative value is not outside the common experience or
knowledge of the trier of fact, then the trier of fact will not be assisted by the testimony of the
expert. Under such circumstances, the testimony will not be admitted in order to prevent a
usurpation of the province of the trier of fact. See McCord, supra note 156, at 71-82.
171. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157.
172. The court may admit the testimony upon instructing the trier of fact to consider the
evidence for one purpose, but not for another. People v. Beckley, 161 Mich. App. 120, 125-26,
409 N.W.2d 759, 761-62 (1987) (The court admitted testimony to explain that the behaviors
displayed by the sexually misused child were not inconsistent with the profile of an incest
victim and cautioned the jury to consider the testimony as bearing neither upon the credibility
of the child nor upon whether the child was in fact an incest victim.).
173. See State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, -, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (1987) (A psychologist's
testimony went to the reliability of the test itself and was not a comment on the credibility of
the witness.); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Wyo. 1987) (A psychologist may testify
on the truthfulness of a child's responses to a psychological test that has internally constructed
validity scales because the testimony is relevant for the purpose of assisting the trier of fact in
evaluating the probative value of the expert's evaluation.). But see People v. Izzo, 90 Mich.
App. 727, 730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 10-11 (1979) (Admission of a psychiatrist's affirmative
response to a question about whether the psychological inventory would detect fabrication and
his followup response that the victim was answering quite honestly was reversible error.).
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and other factors. I74 Further, they rely upon the same basis of sub-
stantially accepted scientific knowledge. 1" Courts will exclude the lat-
ter testimony for lack of relevance, as well as usurpation of the
province of the trier of fact.
G. The Province of the Trier of Fact
The role of the jury would be compromised if the testimony of
experts on matters that are within common knowledge is admissible.
The trier of fact is charged with bringing common experience and
understanding to bear upon the issue of fact in dispute.1 7 6 If this task
is conducted for them by the expert, then the independent judgment
of the jury would be compromised. 177  Rational jurors, when
presented with the testimony of a scientific expert, will likely
subordinate their independent judgment to the judgment of the
expert. 178 To preserve the jury system, it is necessary that the expert
testimony of the psychologist be admissible only if it presents infor-
mation that is beyond the common understanding of the trier of fact.
An expert may testify to matters that will assist the trier of fact
in resolving the factual question presented. 179 While this assistance
includes provision of information that is beyond the common under-
standing of the trier of fact,180 the expert may not instruct the trier of
fact on how to decide.18 1 The expert, more precisely, may not usurp
the role of the trier of fact,182 which includes the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, the weighing of conflicting testimony, and the
174. For a discussion on the factors involved, see People v. Grady, 133 Misc. 2d 211, 213-
15, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
175. See B. JAMES & M. NASJLETI, TREATING SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 45-148 (1983); see, e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 728 P.2d 248, 251
(1986).
176. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 606-07, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1982).
177. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 228-29, 352 A.2d 30, 32 (1976).
178. See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (Expert testimony
creates a substantial risk of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
because of its aura of reliability and trustworthiness.).
179. FED. R. EvID. 702; see United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985)
("Expert testimony should not be permitted if it concerns a subject improper for expert
testimony, for example, one that invades the province of the jury.").
180. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984) (Because the practice of incest
is prohibited in nearly all cultures, the common experience of the trier of fact is not likely to
include knowledge of the behavior patterns of sexually misused children.).
181. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 229, 352 A.2d at 32 (1976) (Permitting an expert to testify as to the
credibility of a witness "would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility
to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that the expert is in a better
position to make such a judgment.").
182. The jury may place undue emphasis upon the testimony because of the special gloss of
the witness' status as an expert. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
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determination of ultimate issues of fact." 3 Rule 704 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, expressly grants the expert witness per-
mission to testify in a manner that embraces ultimate issues.,84 This
is the only area in which the Rules expressly provide an overlap
between the province of the trier of fact and that of the expert witness.
Psychologists have made a concerted effort to disseminate the
results of their psychological research to the public.'8 5 Therefore, a
great deal of expert psychological testimony may be excluded because
it does not communicate new information to the trier of fact. The
subject matter of psychological research and psychotherapeutic prac-
tice-individual people-is within the realm of common experience.
Psychological evaluations generally rely upon either written or spo-
ken communication between the psychologist and the subject. Fre-
quently, psychologists do not employ technical devices in the
evaluation process. Therefore, there is no clear distinction between
the methods of clinicians and the methods of other interviewers.
Information with regard to the evaluation of the credibility of a
witness is within the province of the trier of fact.18 6 Courts condemn
the practice of psychologists testifying as to the credibility of an
alleged victim of sexual misuse.8 7 Courts reject both expert testi-
mony regarding the credibility of a particular victim' and testimony
regarding the tendency of victims as a group to fabricate allegations of
sexual misuse.' 89  The expert has skills that bear upon the issue of
whether a client has been truthful in allegations of sexual misconduct.
183. Garcia v. State, 712 S.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
184. FED. R. EVID. 704.
185. N. HOBBS, MENTAL HEALTH'S THIRD REVOLUTION (1968).
186. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986) ("It is hornbook law that the
credibility of a witness and the weight to be given his testimony rests exclusively with the
jury."); State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986) ("With proper
information, the jury can evaluate credibility as well as an expert.").
187. Azure, 801 F.2d at 339; State v. Lindzey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474, 720 P.2d 73, 75 (1986).
188. But see State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982) (allowing psychological
experts to testify as to the veracity of a child victim of sexual misuse); cf. State v. Middleton,
294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983) (admitting expert testimony to bolster the
testimony of a child victim of sexual misuse).
189. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986) (It was improper to admit expert
testimony that children rarely lie about sexual abuse.); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576,
683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) (A statement about the percentage of children who are molested by
someone that they already know should not have been admitted.). But see State v. Oliver, 85
N.C. App. 1, -, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533-35 (1987) (admitting testimony that mentally retarded
children do not lie about sexual abuse and that they are unable to fantasize about sexual
matters because it is not considered to be within the common understanding of the jury); cf.
Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 444, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1987) ("[O]ne could imagine
'experts' testifying as to the veracity of the elderly, of various ethnic groups, of members of
different religious faiths, of persons employed in various trades and professions, etc.").
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Clinicians are trained in the detection of concordance or discordance
of affect, mannerisms, and verbal content."9 A clinician cannot
ascertain whether the child was in fact sexually misused by the
defendant, but can determine whether the child victim actually
believed that the defendant committed an act of sexual abuse.'91 The
expert, in testifying on this point, would usurp a significant portion of
the role of the trier of fact. Generally, courts do not allow such
testimony.
Courts' handling of expert testimony on veracity issues in sexual
misuse cases may be understood by analogy to the manner in which
courts have treated the admissibility of expert testimony on the relia-
bility of eyewitness testimony. The expert may testify about factors
that have an impact on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, 192 but
may not venture an opinion on the reliability of the eyewitness in a
particular case. 19 3 Courts in some jurisdictions have expressly under-
taken to address the unreliability of eyewitness testimony by
instructing the jury with regard to the risk that the eyewitness testi-
mony may be in error. 94 This alerts the jurors to factors that may be
relevant in evaluating the credibility of eyewitness identification.' 95
The expert may then testify only if there are particular facts that will
serve to modify the general notion that eyewitness testimony may be
erroneous. The testimony may not include statistics that serve to
inform the trier of fact of percentages of correct eyewitness identifica-
tions under specified circumstances because they would not be rele-
vant to the issue of whether the eyewitness identification in the
particular case was correct. 96
Courts generally prefer to admit the testimony of experts in child
190. For example, a California court commented regarding the testimony of a psychological
expert as follows:
[The expert's] conclusion was based primarily on 'what the children told me' and
'the way in which they told me.' Specifically, he relied on the consistency of their
reports of abuse and the manner in which they reported the abuse, their
demonstrations of emotion during the interview, the absence of any depreciation
of their father, their demonstrated ability to discriminate between events that did
or did not occur, their behavior with anatomically correct dolls, and the general
'air of realism' in their assertions.
In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 678, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631 (1987).
191. Eastman v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (An expert may
testify to his findings that in the child's mind, the sexual behavior actually happened.).
192. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984).
193. People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 218-21, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661-62 (1986).
194. People v. Palmer, 154 Cal. App. 3d 79, 84-90, 203 Cal. Rptr. 474, 477-81 (1984).
195. Palmer, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 84-90, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 477-81.
196. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250, 690 P.2d at 723 (1984); Gray, 187
Cal. App. 3d at 218-21, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
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sexual misuse cases, even though it may overlap with the province of
the trier of fact. The expert may testify about ultimate issues, 197 and
may present circumstantial evidence 'based upon either personal
knowledge or knowledge of the field.198 Generally, any doubt as to
whether the subject is within the common knowledge of the jury is
resolved in favor of admissibility. Courts, however, carefully guard
the province of the jury from the final onslaught by the expert wit-
ness: the presentation of an expert's evaluation of the credibility of a
witness. A frequent basis for the reversal of convictions in cases that
involve the sexual misuse of children is the expert's testimony on the
credibility of the child witness.' 9 9 Such testimony includes both testi-
mony regarding the veracity of the child and the statistical probability
that the child will be untruthful.
Similarly, expert testimony in child sexual misuse cases regard-
ing behavioral signs that are related to the veracity of a victim may be
admissible.2°° The trier of fact is given the benefit of the expert's
knowledge of behavioral signs associated with veracity, but not the
expert's skills in the application to the facts of the particular case.
The latter is defined as being exclusively within the province of the
trier of fact, and therefore, is not an appropriate subject for the testi-
mony of experts.2°'
Courts are also concerned with considerations of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of issues, and judicial efficiency, all of which are
embodied in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 20 2 Rule 403
requires a balancing of probative value against both trial concerns and
the risk of prejudicial effect. There is a special risk of undue prejudice
associated with the admission of expert testimony. The trier of fact
may believe the expert because of the expert's status. In addition, the
trier of fact is likely to assume that the expert is vouching for the
197. FED. R. EvID. 704. But see State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383, 728 P.2d 248, 253
(1986) ("Rule 704 was not intended to permit experts to tell the jury what result to reach.").
198. State v. Laird, - Mont. -, -, 732 P.2d 417, 420 (1987); see State v. Oliver, 85 N.C.
App. 1, -, 354 S.E.2d 527, 534 (1987) (An expert may testify as to statements contained in
periodicals established as reliable authority when they were relied upon for the formulation of
the expert's opinion.).
199. See, e.g., State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 586-88, 347 S.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1986)
(Testimony that in the expert's opinion the child had testified truthfully is inadmissible because
credibility was determined by the trier of fact.).
200. United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985).
201. Commonwealth v. Shaver, 501 Pa. 167, 173, 460 A.2d 742, 745 (1983) ("It is solely the
province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses .... ").
202. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1977) (The
weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect was incorporated within the court's
adoption of the reliability standard to determine the admissibility of expert evidence.).
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veracity of the complaining child, even if the expert does not do so. 20 3
The court looks at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
proponent, and evaluates whether the probative value of the evidence
is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice.2"
The risk that the expert will confuse the issues and mislead the
trier of fact is largely addressed by the imposition of reliability and
relevance standards.2 °5 The trier of fact is less likely to be misled if
the testimony is in accordance with substantially accepted scientific
principles and methods. The court, by requiring a rigorous showing
of the relevance of the proffered testimony, will minimize the risk of
the trier of fact being led astray.
H. Expert Witness Roles Revisited
Expert witnesses generally have been accorded one of four roles
in cases involving the sexual misuse of children: Evaluating the truth-
fulness of the child's allegations; evaluating the consistency of the
child's behavior patterns with the experience of a sexually abusive
event; evaluating the correspondence between the child's behavioral
attributes as admitted into evidence and the prior occurrence of a sex-
ually abusive event; and educating the trier of fact with regard to the
content of psychological knowledge of sexual misuse and its conse-
quences.20 6 In addition this Comment proposes a fifth role for the
psychological expert, which will be examined in Section III.
The first role includes both the psychological evaluation of the
child and the expert's testimony as to the child's veracity. This role,
however, invades the province of the trier of fact. The expert operat-
ing within this role is not testifying as to matters that may serve to
corroborate or impeach the testimony of another witness, but rather is
determining which witness is worthy of belief. Such a determination
is a task generally assigned to the trier of fact.
Further, it can be argued that the reliability of the evaluative
skills of psychologists in determining the occurrence of a past event
has not been established through the application of the Frye test or its
modifications. The qualifications of psychologists as expert witnesses,
203. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
204. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985) ("[E]ven helpful, relevant evidence
may be exluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or of misleading the jury."); accord United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979).
205. See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Because of the
peculiar risks of expert testimony, courts have imposed an additional test, i.e. that the
testimony be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory theory.").
206. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
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in both clinical and scientific capacities, do not encompass the ability
to detect lies. Therefore, the testimony of the expert as to the veracity
of the child is beyond the expert's expertise. The expert's personal
opinion as to the child's veracity is not relevant. For both of these
reasons, the first role for expert witnesses is not acceptable, and such
testimony should not be admitted.
The second role of the expert may be analogized to that of a
treating physician. The expert conducts an evaluation, notes symp-
toms and behavior patterns, formulates a diagnostic opinion, and may
formulate an opinion as to whether the behaviors and symptoms
observed are consistent with the occurrence of a particular event, i.e.,
sexual misuse. These tasks are all within the expertise of the clinical
expert. They generally are considered to be reliable by the psycholog-
ical community and they are relevant to the task at hand. Therefore,
this role for the expert witness is acceptable.
There is, however, an area of concern within this role. The
expert will testify as to statements by the child or others for the pur-
pose of medical diagnosis or treatment. It is possible, however, that
the expert will not record or recollect statements that are not consis-
tent with the expert's formulated opinion. Therefore, there exists a
built-in bias.
The third role of expert witnesses in child sexual misuse cases
involves the testimony of an expert who did not examine the child.
This expert is a clinician. As such, the expert testifies as to, general
clinical patterns observed in sexually misused children, and responds
to hypothetical questions incorporating the facts of the case at hand.
The testimony is analogous to that in role two, except that it lacks the
risks associated with possible selective recording and recollection of
statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment.
The fourth role is an educational model. The expert is qualified
based upon familiarity with the scientific study of behavior. The role
of such an expert is to provide the trier of fact with information that
will assist it in its evaluation of the child's behavior patterns. This
role is also generally acceptable.
The fifth and final role for expert witnesses in child sexual misuse
cases is that of preserving perishable and fragile testimony. This
Comment proposes this role for three reasons. First, the expert is
skilled in the elicitation of both verbal and nonverbal communication
from a child. Second, it is desirable that a neutral party assume this
role; no one other than an independent psychological expert is avail-
able to act in a neutral capacity. Third, it is a role required of the
clinical expert when engaging in the diagnosis and treatment of the
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child, and is a role the treating clinician assumes unconsciously. The
rationale for this role is discussed below.
III. THE EXPERT AS PRESERVER OF PERISHABLE
AND FRAGILE TESTIMONY
The testimony of a child witness is perishable.2 7  The time
between an incident of sexual misuse and the date of the defendant's
trial may be in excess of two years. For example, a child sexually
misused at age four may be six before the case goes to trial. Life
experiences for such a child will have been increased 50 percent. A
large delay, measured as relative to the amount of life experiences,
may result in errors in recall.
The testimony of a child witness is also fragile.20" Children do
not possess the linguistic structure of adults. Therefore, they are not
readily able to communicate to others facts regarding the sexual mis-
use to which they have been subjected. Lacking the ability to commu-
nicate effectively through words, the child must communicate
through other means.20 9 These methods include reenactment,2 10 pro-
jective expression,21 I and nonspecific indicators of discomfort.212
The clinical psychologist is an expert in the elicitation of infor-
mation from a patient.213 A clinician is trained to observe verbal and
nonverbal behavior.214 The child will not communicate effectively
unless the child perceives that someone is actively listening, and that
it is safe to communicate. 215 The particular skills involved in facilitat-
ing communication form a large component of the training of all
mental health professionals. 216 A qualified clinician may elicit infor-
mation that is not available to an individual without the special skills
of the clinician.
Thus the clinician should be qualified as an expert in the elicita-
tion of the child victim's testimony. The clinician's special skills in
207. See, e.g., State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Iowa 1986) (The child could
not remember the alleged sexual abuse incident.).
208. Id. at 378.
209. J. PALMER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN 7-37 (1970); see also
People v. Draper, 150 Mich. App. 481, 484, 389 N.W.2d 89, 91 (1986) (Testimony by a
psychologist admitted in a case that involved a three-year-old child included a description of
the child's spontaneous play with Play-Doh.).
210. See generally V. AXLINE, PLAY THERAPY (1947).
211. Id.
212. See generally E. BEIER, THE SILENT LANGUAGE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1966).
213. H. SULLIVAN, THE PSYCHIATRIC INTERVIEW 82-129 (1954).
214. See generally V. COOK, INTELLIGENT TESTING (1984).
215. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 31-41 (5th ed. 1982).
216. G. EGAN, THE SKILLED HELPER 14-61 (1975).
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this regard are analogous to the skills of a technician in gaining access
to information contained within an automobile driver's blood. Both
gain access to information that is probative but unavailable without
the application of their special skills. Given proper preservation of
this evidence in the most neutral manner possible, this testimony
should be admissible.
The evidence elicited by the clinician may be preserved through
the use of video recording of all contacts between the clinician and the
child that are for diagnostic and evaluative purposes. Such a record is
analogous to the report of the chemical analysis prepared by the tech-
nician in the evaluation of a blood sample for the existence of drugs or
alcohol. Experts on both sides may dispute the interpretation of the
evidence so preserved. This leaves the trier of fact's province intact.
Courts do not qualify the expert by documented expertise in the
elicitation and preservation of the testimony of children. Yet, the
expert is actually engaged in this activity under some circum-
stances.217 When the expert testifies as to how the child behaved with
anatomically correct dolls, or about some psychological sign of sexual
misuse, the expert is repeating the communications of the child wit-
ness. The expert elicited the behavior of the child and preserved its
relevant components for the purpose of the expert's in-court
testimony.
An expert's testimony as to the out-of-court assertions of a sexu-
ally misused child, may be admissible through a specified hearsay
exception .2 " Further, the testimony should be regularly admissible
217. Psychological assessment is premised upon the controlled sampling of behavioral
responses to known stimuli. J. PALMER, supra note 209, at 15-22. The clinician is required to
record verbatim the child's reactions to such stimuli. Id. After the behavior is elicited and
preserved, the clinician renders an interpretation. Id.
218. The testimony may be admitted as either an excited utterance or a statement for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2), (4). Yet apparently the
rationale of the medical diagnosis exception does not properly apply to the verbalizations of a
child. In addition, the lengthy delay that frequently occurs between the sexual misuse and the
child's disclosure serves to diminish the reasonable application of the excited utterance
exception. If the credibility of the child is attacked, and if either the child is alleged to have
recently fabricated the accusation, or is charged with improper motive or influence, then the
trial judge may admit the evidence as a prior consistent statement. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(l)(B). See State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa 1986). This Comment
suggests that the admission of psychological expert testimony be permitted under the "other
exceptions" category for unavailable testimony. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
Of course, some jurisdictions permit the admission of psychological expert testimony
under special hearsay exceptions for cases involving the sexual misuse of children. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd) (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9a44.120 (1974). See generally Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face
Confrontation, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (discussing the reliability of special and traditional
hearsay exceptions in cases involving the sexual misuse of children).
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through the application of the "other reliable hearsay" exception as
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5). This exception assumes that the child's
testimony is not available. 219  Equivalent guarantees of trustworthi-
ness are required by the Rule. This requirement can be met by vide-
otaping all contacts between the expert and the child that are for the
purpose of evaluation,220 assuring the independence of the clinical
expert, 22 1 and by providing the videotape to all parties for analysis by
competing experts.222
Some courts have permitted experts to testify as to statements
that were made to them by a sexually misused child. This may be
permitted as a "statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment"
hearsay exception,223 or a hearsay exemption for prior consistent
statements offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. 2 4 In still
other jurisdictions statutes have established specific hearsay excep-
tions for cases that involve sexual misuse.225 These exceptions, how-
ever, do not explicitly recognize the importance of the behavior of the
expert in the elicitation of testimony, nor do they protect against the
risk of the expert leading the child to respond in a particular direc-
tion. The suggested requirement of video recording would address
these concerns.
All hearsay statements include the risk that the in-court witness
will not accurately observe, record, recollect, or reiterate the out-of-
219. The availability of the child's testimony-not the child-is relevant. See FED. R.
EVID. 804(a). The child's testimony is perishable, and may therefore no longer be available at
the time of trial. Further, the child's testimony may not be accessible in an adversarial
proceeding.
220. In order to counter charges that the expert inappropriately led the child, all contacts
between the expert and the child should be videotaped. This includes both the initial contact
and all subsequent sessions, without any gaps or exceptions, until such time as the expert is
assured that the child will not divulge new information. At that time, the expert may switch
from an evaluative to a psychotherapeutic process.
221. An expert who is an employee of the prosecutorial sector has inherent biases. The bias
should be minimized by requiring the expert to be independent. It is understood, of course,
that an element of collaboration between the expert and the prosecutor must exist. There
should, however, be no structural, administrative or supervisory overlap between the two.
222. It may not be necessary for the video to be shown to the trier of fact. The video should
be made available for the opposing counsel's expert. The attorneys involved should make
reasonable efforts to stipulate to a description of the contents of the video. The trier of fact
may then be given an interpretation of the stipulated material by the prosecutor's expert, the
defendant's expert, or both. If the description of the child's behavior is sufficiently
unambiguous that an interpretation is not necessary, then it may be read into the record.
223. See cases cited supra notes 81 & 86.
224. State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa 1986).
225. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10 (1983); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(dd) (1982); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982).
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court declarant's assertion. The proposed exception takes this into
account by requiring the recording of all contacts between the expert
and the child. The court retains authority to exclude the testimony
because of concerns relating to waste of time and unfair prejudice as
provided in Rule 403.226 Generally, the videotape should not be
played in court. Instead, experts should testify as to the tape's con-
tent and may provide any appropriate interpretations. The tape itself
is played in court only when there is a conflict about the content of
the tape, or with advance leave of the court. The availability of the
tape to both parties will minimize the hearsay risks associated with
the admission of the out-of-court declaration.
The expert who conducts the evaluation of the child must be
neutral. In order to address allegations of an absence of neutrality, it
should be possible to admit portions of the videotape with the court's
permission. The defendant may also request the court to admit por-
tions of the tape that serve to indicate the unreliability of the child
witness. The defendant, however, then risks the possibility that the
prosecution will apply other portions of the tape to rebut this
evidence.
These protections provide guarantees of reliability that are
equivalent to those of the traditional hearsay exceptions. Such testi-
mony, therefore, should be admissible under the "other reliable hear-
say" exception. Although legislative enactment of a particular
hearsay exception delineating the procedures mentioned above may
be desirable in order to establish clearly whether hearsay testimony in
child sexual misuse cases is admissible, the structure of the rules of
evidence in some jurisdictions permits a judicial adoption of such a
hearsay exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
The testimony of psychological experts may be of assistance to
the trier of fact in cases involving the sexual misuse of children. It
may provide the trier of fact with evidence of psychological injury
that may corroborate allegations of sexual misuse. The expert may
provide normative data that serve to assist the trier of fact in assigning
probative value to circumstantial facts admitted into evidence. This
Comment proposes that the expert may also preserve the testimony of
a child victim whose testimony, as a consequence of the child's youth,
may be unavailable at the time of trial.
The search for truth will be enhanced in child sexual misuse
226. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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cases by courts permitting expert psychological testimony as proposed
in this Comment. Such expert testimony would maximize the trier of
fact's access to reliable information without usurping its role.
Although the likelihood of obtaining a conviction in a criminal prose-
cution may be enhanced, it does not unfairly prejudice the accused.
The increased likelihood of conviction may encourage more offenders
to volunteer for participation in a treatment program as an alternative
to incarceration, thereby decreasing the overall cost to society in the
management of sexual offenders. Thus, the interests of justice and
society will be served.
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